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There is always much to learn when bright colleagues devote time and 
energy to evaluating one’s own work carefully. The previous issue of Etica & 
Politica / Ethics & Politics offers a clear example of such an opportunity. The 
seven articles, constituting the Symposium on my book, The Philosophy of 
Information, cover a very wide spectrum of topics, insightfully and 
interestingly. They are very welcome steps forward in the development of 
the philosophy of information, not least because they make the latter much 
less a label for my own work and much more the name of an independent 
program of research, to which I have contributed. There is no space (and if 
there were, the exercise would be too tedious for the reader anyway) to detail 
all the lessons that I hope I might have learnt by reading them. So, what I 
shall do in this short article is to highlight some of the key points that I 
found most valuable. They are not the only ones, and other readers, or 
indeed the authors of the articles, may disagree on my selection; but they 
should offer a good sample of the stimulating contents to be found in the 
Symposium. I shall proceed by grouping the articles together not in terms of 
order of publication, but in terms of comments that I shall offer about them.  
Let me start with the three more technical articles by Gamez, Cevolani, 
and Wolf. Gamez uses my work on semantic information to improve 
contemporary approaches to consciousness in terms of information 
integration. As Gamez acknowledges, and I agree with him, a major problem 
is that “consciousness is a real phenomena, whereas the information states 
that a system holds appear to largely depend on a subjective interpretation - 
and it is difficult to see how something that is metaphysically real can be 
correlated with or identified with a subjective interpretation”. He seeks to 
resolve this impasse by arguing that the information integration theory of 
consciousness could be improved by revising it in terms of a data theory of 
consciousness, thus relying on my work on the notion of data in order to 
account for the objective properties of a physical system more successfully. 
This seems to me to be a very promising step forward, also in view of a 
further improvement in our understanding of self-consciousness.  
Cevolani and Wolf also concentrate their attention on my work on 
semantic information, although not on how the latter accounts for data, but 
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on how it approaches the relation between data and information. Both 
concern my formulation of a theory of strongly semantic information, or 
TSSI (Floridi 2004; Floridi 2011a), according to which semantic information 
is well-formed, meaningful and truthful data. Each provides very useful 
improvements on my initial work. Cevolani concludes by suggesting that 
“the notion of partial truth captures all the essential intuitions underlying 
Floridi’s theory”. This may well be the case, and I remain indebted to 
Cevolani for his fine analysis of TSSI in terms of verisimilitude. Wolf offers 
an important “insight into some of the nuances of the theory […]” and an 
improved “constraint that closely ties the informativeness function to the 
properties of the information system under study. This new constraint 
increases the robustness of TSSI”. In this case too, TSSI emerges as a better 
theory after Wolf’s careful revision. My contribution to their discussion of 
TSSI concerns a quick clarification of a philosophical feature of the theory 
that I am afraid I might have contributed to popularise, even if I do not 
endorse it. When presenting TSSI, I often speak in spatial terms, referring to 
distances, approximations, closeness, and so forth, between some 
information, say p, and its referent, that is, the state of affairs that the 
information in question seeks to capture, call it w. I do not believe this to be 
a problem in itself (see for example (Floridi 2010a)) but, in adopting such 
vocabulary, I might have given the impression that I subscribe to some kind 
of Platonism, whereby truths, truthful descriptions of w, or indeed features 
of w in themselves, are like targets, existing independently of our intellectual 
activities, fully formed, and hence such that some information p may miss 
them entirely, or get more or less closely, or perhaps hit. Such a Platonist 
reading would be a mistake, and I hope this explains why, in my research, I 
stayed away from any “verisimilitude” approach. From a constructionist 
perspective, truths are ultimately designed, so some semantic information p 
can be more or less close to its referent w only metaphorically, when discussing 
the foundations of our knowledge of the world in the deepest sense, or 
secondarily, when talking about the approximation between different bits of 
information among themselves, e.g. between my perception of where and 
when the train leaves and the train timetable. In everyday parlance, none of 
this generates any problem at all, but it is a philosophically troublesome 
issue for any philosopher who, like myself, rejects a representationalist 
interpretation of semantic information and therefore of the corresponding 
knowledge based on it. Ultimately, our perceptual interactions with reality 
consist in making sense of it, but such “semanticisation” is not closer to, or 
more distant from, the elements (data as constraining affordances) that it 
seeks to put together, in the same sense in which a crème brûlée is not more or 
less “distant” from its ingredients, if not just metaphorically. The analogy 
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clarifies that there is of course a perfectly reasonable sense in which our 
interpretations of the interpreted reality are more or less distant from their 
referents, again in the same sense in which this or that crème brûlée is more or 
less close to what we would consider a good crème brûlée according to the 
right recipe. But it is a mistake to assume that there is only one relation of 
reference: the rules of engagement between information and reality (dish vs. 
ingredients) are not the same as the rules of engagement between 
information and information (recipe vs. dish). In the former case, we are 
talking about the data-ingredients that come from (or constitute) reality and 
that information cannot approximate but only more or less correctly model. 
This is why, in The Philosophy of Information, I introduce a correctness 
theory of truth (Floridi 2010b; 2012). In the latter case, forms of 
correspondentism are perfectly justified, but then they are also 
philosophically naïve insofar as the fundamental game of making sense of 
the world is already over. 
Wolf concludes his article by suggesting that “the analysis also provides 
a minor extension of TSSI into misinformation. Given the pervasiveness of 
misinformation and its interplay with information in the world in which we 
live, a real test of the strength of TSSI would be the development of a 
complete extension that thoroughly accounts for misinformation and its 
interplay with information. […] As TSSI is refined to take into account 
experiences with information and misinformation, its value as an analytical 
tool will increase”. I agree and I would welcome such extension. It would 
perhaps address some of the criticisms moved by Fallis in his article. I must 
confess that I have the impression that Fallis is ultimately overstating his 
case. I do not think he is mistaken, but I still find perfectly fine to use 
“misinformation” to refer to false semantic information (e.g., Alice thinks 
that Milan is the capital of Italy, but she is misinformed), and 
“disinformation” to misinformation that is disseminated in order to mislead 
its receiver (e.g., Alice knows that the capital of Italy is Rome but she tells 
Bob that it is Milan in order to disinform him). The mis- in “misinformation” 
seems to go hand in hand with the mis- in “mistake”, but of course all this is 
largely a matter of linguistic conventions and uses. It is the point where 
philosophy becomes lexicography and taxonomy, and hence uninteresting. 
Of course, plenty of conceptual refinements are possible. After all, we should 
not expect the two concepts to be any less Protean than that of information 
itself (Floridi 2010c). But the important question to ask is not how far we 
can go with the fine slicing of a variety of different meanings and peculiar 
cases, but whether this is worth the effort. Fallis has not convinced me that 
it is. Imagine Alice measures a steel rail on a railroad and tells Bob that it is 
20m long (66 ft in the UK). Bob double-checks her measurement and 
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discovers that, actually, to be precise, some steel rails can be quite a bit 
longer while others can be quite a bit shorter, and, moreover, their lengths 
can also vary depending on the temperature, and hence on when they are 
measured. So should Bob simply reject Alice’s measure because “it is not yet 
clear that we have an adequate account” of the length of the steel rail? That 
depends on what the measure is for. For example, if Alice wishes to know 
how many steel rails her company needs to buy to cover the distance 
between two cities, centimetres will be rather pointless. However, they might 
be important when Bob deals with problems concerning the introduction of 
welded rail joints, which might require more finely grained measurements. 
The criticisms offered by Fallis in terms of visual disinformation, true 
disinformation, side effect disinformation, and evolutionary disinformation 
are interesting, but they concern centimetres, whereas I was giving the 
length of the steel rail in metres. Every concept should be used as precisely 
as possible, but not more precisely, to adapt something allegedly said by 
Einstein. Misinformation and disinformation are no exceptions. Nor is 
information, which remains a concept and a phenomenon impossible to pin 
down to those necessary and sufficient conditions so dear to some analytic 
philosophers who do not know better.  
The previous comment leads me to Krebs’ article and his welcome 
reminder that “Informativity [sic] depends on a given medial [sic] 
constellation as well as the interpreter, her competence and her contextually 
variable (epistemic) interests”. This seems to be right, despite the unusual 
terminology. Concepts are semantic artefacts designed for a purpose, which 
they may fulfil more or less successfully. The point of conceptual analysis is 
not (and indeed should never be) to dissect them in a vacuum of contexts, 
practices, applications, and users, but to clarify, if necessary, how and why 
they work the way they do and, in case, try to improve them (Floridi 2008). 
There is something intellectually repulsive in displaying them in a glass-
covered box, with the several conceptual species neatly labelled and 
mounted on pins.   
I have left Beavers’ and Durante’s articles last because they seem to me 
to be the most encompassing. It would be pointless to go through the long 
list of points on which I agree with them. So let me offer in each case a small 
contribution to our mutual understanding.  
Beavers rightly emphasises, among other things, that in my work  “any 
philosophy of import – and let us not forget that those with no import are 
also not remembered – 1) is embodied in the ethos of a time and 2) set to 
answer questions that are pressing for its day. Consequently, 3) genuine 
philosophy changes over time”. Today, this means developing a 
constructionist (not a constructivist) philosophy that can account for our 
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semantic artefacts and design or re-purpose those needed by our new 
infosphere. Let me add two clarifications to this. First, in the past, I have 
spoken of such a philosophical task in terms of conceptual engineering (Floridi 
2011b). But more recently I came to realise that the very word “engineering” 
may generate confusion. True, both Descartes and Wittgenstein were 
engineers. Yet the concept has mechanical and deterministic overtones that I 
would be reluctant to endorse but that are difficult to shake off. I now find it 
rather clunky, and hence I much prefer speaking of conceptual design, 
especially in view of the fact that design is neither discovery nor invention, 
but indeed the art of exploiting constraining affordances intelligently and 
teleologically, in view of a specific goal. Thus, to the reader who may wish to 
build a network of references and “embed” the constructivism advocated in 
my philosophy of information into a more contextualised set of influences 
and perspectives, I would highly recommend reading (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994). Second, once constructivism is understood as a realistic philosophy, 
which treats semantic artefacts as mind- and reality- dependent—in the 
same way as a house is the outcome of a specific architectural design both 
constrained and afforded by the building materials—it becomes clear that 
relativism is avoided at the expense of representationalism. For the 
equations in front of us are rather simple: we can either embrace a 
representationalist epistemology, which can avoid relativism by dropping 
the constructionist stance; or we can accept the fact that we are in charge of 
our conceptual constructions, some of which are very ill-conceived 
(astrology, homeopathy, Othello’s understanding of Desdemona’s behaviour, 
etc.) while others are increasingly successful in making sense of the world 
(astrophysics, medicine, the perfect understanding between Romeo and 
Juliet, etc.), but then constructionism without relativism becomes possible 
only by unveiling representationalist epistemology as another ill-conceived 
artefact.  
In his article, Durante emphasises epistemic responsibility as a crucial 
factor in the constructionist stance supported by my philosophy of 
information. As I have just indicated, this is a very perceptive insight. It is 
one of the most important senses in which my philosophy of information is 
Cartesian and Kantian. Human beings have a special call, as the only 
semantic engines and intelligent informational organisms in the universe (at 
least to the best of current knowledge): they are the only entities responsible 
for the semanticisation of reality. This simple truth has many consequences. 
I would like to highlight two of them by way of conclusion of this short set of 
replies. 
The first consequence concerns the nature of the constraining 
affordances. We saw that humanity designs semantic artefacts and 
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meaningful interpretations of reality by relying on constraining affordances. 
In terms of knowledge, these are the ultimate data that link our knowledge of 
reality to its referent. In terms of practices, such constraining affordances are 
the rules that shape our behaviour. Let me explain. In so far as data are 
relational differences (imagine the red light at a crossroads) and rules are 
conditional relations (“stop at the red light” understood as “if you do not 
stop at the red light you may cause an accident and incur in a fine”), they 
both enable agents like us (but not only like us, think of a robot, a dog, or a 
company) to interact with their environment and other agents more or less 
successfully. Data and rules are the constraining affordances thanks to which 
we are dynamically embedded in the world, to the extent that anarchy (the 
absence of any norms or rules) may be seen as the counterpart of datalessness 
(the absence of any distinctions or differences), leading to a kind of agnosia 
(the absence of any perception of data or rules because there are none). 
The second consequence concerns the unique ethical duty that follows 
from humanity’s unique semanticising role. The epistemic responsibility 
involved in the design of a meaningful reality is not just an epistemological 
task, placed on our shoulders as individual epistemic agents. It is also, and 
probably more importantly, a social and ethical obligation that we have 
towards each other. If we and no one else make reality meaningful to 
ourselves and to others; if there is no other source of meaning in the universe 
but us; if our “semantic currency’ is not backed up by some God standard; 
then there is only an immanent semantics, which is up to us to design, 
develop, protect, and share. This is our call. From it, it follows that each 
human life becomes valuable, and something to be cherished, as a precious 
source of sense-making. It would be a logical mistake to read such call 
solipsistically (and here is where I distance myself from Descartes and Kant), 
for the following reason. Semanticisation is an information process. 
Information, however, is not like any other ordinary good. It is non-
rivalrous: Alice holding (consuming) the information that p does not prevent 
Bob from holding (consuming) the same information at the same time. It 
tends to be non-excludable. Some information – such as intellectual 
properties, non-public and sensitive data, or military secrets – is often 
protected, but this requires a positive effort precisely because, normally, 
exclusion is not a natural property of information, which tends to be easily 
disclosed and shareable. By contrast, if Alice lends her car to Bod, she cannot 
use it at the same time. Finally, once some information is available, the cost 
of its reproduction and dissemination tends to be negligible (zero marginal 
cost). This is of course not the case with many goods such as a loaf of bread. 
For all these reasons information may be sometimes seen as a public good, a 
view which in turn justifies the creation of public libraries or projects such as 
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Wikipedia, which are freely accessible to anyone. But then, semanticisation 
is a social process, to which we may contribute only a bit but from which we 
benefit enormously. Most, indeed almost (yet not) all the sense we can give to 
our lives is due to the sense-making activities of millions of other people. Hell 
is not the other, but the death of the other. As any old person knows, 
solitude is a social choice, made possible by the presence of others, but 
loneliness is a desperate condition due to the absence of any other.  
To return to the initial comment on Durante’s article, in the same way 
as data and rules are the relations representing the constraining affordances 
for our behaviour (not only epistemic), our semanticisation of them is both 
an epistemic and ethical task that we can fulfil only as social agents. 
Civilization is both an epistemic and an ethical concept for a multiagent 
system. 
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